Robert Wright has a tough task. He is a proponent of evolutionary psychology, a field tainted by historical associations with such extreme ideas as social Darwinism. In fact, evolutionary psychology, and its cousin sociobiology, are distinct disciplines from the cynical, politically motivated social Darwinist ideology. But Wright must describe his field under the dark shadow of these other associations, which gives his book a defensive ring in some sections.
The full title is "The Moral Animal: Why We Are the Way We Are: the New Science of Evolutionary Psychology." What a staggering set of phrases. First of all, how are we? I don't even know "the way we are," so I was a little unsure about jumping right to questions of "why." Furthermore, there is an early whiff of defensiveness: note that he explicitly proclaims evolutionary psychology to be both "new" and a "science." No wonder the book is quite thick-- there's a lot of explaining to do. But I plunged in, and in the end, I'll rate the book a "strong 0," bordering on "weak +." It's worth reading, even if you grit your teeth here and there.
The premise behind evolutionary psychology is almost obvious. Human behavior is influenced by our genes, both in terms of the common genes that span our species and make it distinct, and in terms of the particular genes that individuals possess, which render them more or less successful in the game of life.
Well, duh. It's hard to imagine that my DNA doesn't have something to do with why I have certain feelings and think certain thoughts. Those genes coded my brain, after all. And genes code the nervous systems of every creature on Earth, too.
An immediate caveat is that evolutionary psychology does not discount the environment. Wright spends considerable time giving examples of the strong influence of external conditions on animal behavior. At the most basic level, any scientist who understands evolution knows that the environment affects which genes are expressed-- meaning that if a human with your genetic makeup had been born in other circumstances, you would have turned out looking a bit different, as well as having somewhat different feelings.
But even more importantly, external conditions help define a range of behaviors or strategies that could potentially bring genetic success to you (that is, allow you to reproduce). And your genes are exquisitely tuned to adapt you to that environment and help you pursue a viable strategy. (As Wright notes in the book, the language for describing this science often winds up producing phrases like "your genes help you do something" or "your genes want you to behave this way." Of course, it is not implied that genes themselves have some sort of conscious volition. When you read these phrases, please understand that they are not literal).
So we are flexible creatures, designed to be only half-baked, as it were. The best tool is one that strikes a balance between being perfectly adapted for one use (and useless in all other cases) and being only half-good at everything. Our genes are continuously evolving to strike that balance. They make us feel certain feelings, which prompt certain actions, which may help to get our genes into the next generation. Those that do so successfully will have the chance to make another generation of humans have those feelings.
This is all fine. I accept that my genes-- in conjunction with the environment they sense themselves to be in through my sensory organs-- are influencing how I feel, in a broad effort to get themselves into another human. Much of the first part of "The Moral Animal" is about getting readers confortable with thinking in this way.
But that's barely an extension of traditional evolutionary theory. Evolutionary psychology takes a bolder step, attempting to explain why those particualr feelings are the ones that will help spread the genes. Wright also discusses at length this more extended use of the evolutionary framework.
Wright talks about kin selection, "reciprocal altruism", friendship, love, guilt, and shame. He explains how each of these human experiences can be analyzed through the genetic lens to create a coherent picture of human social interactions (and sexual negotiations).
Finally, near the end of the book, Wright tackles the hardest question: is there room here for ethics? If we are all just trying to reproduce, it is arguable that "ethics" are nothing more than some kind of psychological structure, cynically directed toward reproduction. Humans are social creatures and need a social framework in which to reproduce (aka "society", be it a small tribe or a large civilization). Ethics-- concepts of honor, honesty, revulsion about murder, etc-- could simply be built into our brains as feelings we have that allow the creation of a stable society, which then allows humans to reproduce successfully.
Wright doesn't think it's this simple. The above paragraph implies that a hands-off approach to ethics will be fine in the end. We are all programmed to want a stable society through these feelings of guilt, love, public outrage, etc, so we can relax and let evolutionary forces direct us toward a benign civilization. Wright doesn't buy this at all. As he has explained earlier for the simpler cases of achieving sex, all genes really do for us is give us a flexible range of strategies. Within that range, we might not find all the options desirable for any given society. In other words, there is still room for moral choices within evolutionary psychology.
Throughout the book, Wright takes breaks to focus the reader on concrete examples of what he is describing. He usually takes the life of Charles Darwin as his prototype, noting how successful his marriage strategy was, as well as a number a career moves and friendships that helped enhance his social status. In the sections more focused on ethics, this leads to discussions of Victorian morals and mores.
I found many ideas in the book to be convincing and well-argued. However, the farther Wright ventured from basic evolutionary theory, the less convincing I found his ideas. The sections on ethics in particular were quite speculative; few experiments have yet been done in this area anyway. (To be fair, Wright acknowledges this, and states that he hopes the book will help spur some new research to confirm or deny the validity of these ideas). I think it's important to think of this field as a work still in progress-- as all sciences are, by the way!
Other gaps in the logic were less related to the lack of experimental studies, and thus caused greater concern. For instance, Wright is fond of reminding readers that what really matters for our psychology is the "ancestral environment" in which we evolved. Our brains developed while humans were living in hunter-gatherer tribes in a sparsely populated world. We existed in that form for more than 90% of the time we've had a modern brain. Hence, Wright cautions that some strategies will seem counterproductive in industrial society, but still fit the theory because they were good strategies in the ancestral environment.
This is a fine argument, except Wright only uses it selectively. His key case study is Charles Darwin, a member of an industrialized society. Wright works out detailed evolutionary explanations of why Darwin's sexual and career strategies made sense. But given the caveat about the ancestral environment, why should I believe this to be much more than a fluke? Turned around, if it is not a fluke, then why does Wright sometimes dismiss anomalous modern behavior as irrelevant because it occurred outside our ancestral environment? A lot of this smacks of saying, "Evolutionary psychology works except when it doesn't, in which case you weren't applying it correctly."
Another such "safety valve" appears also. It is of course true that genes are not binary, noninteracting switches. That is, each of your traits and behaviors is not governed by a single gene. You are an incredibly complex mixture of writhing, interacting, partially expressed, occasionally mutated genetic structures. In optimizing your genetic fitness, evolution operates somewhat bluntly. It may preserve a certain gene or combination of genes for their positive effect, but carry along some other effects as "baggage," which may or may not really contribute to reproduction. The classic example is sickle cell anemia. It happens that the gene for sickle cell anemia also acts with other genes to provide some protection against malaria. In fact, the protection it provides "outweighs" the detriment of sickle cell anemia-- that is, people with the gene are more likely to reproduce even though they suffer from (or carry) sickle cell anemia. Hence, the gene has survived and even spread through malaria-infested regions.
Fine. This makes sense. But it also provides Wright with a safety valve. If a given behavior doesn't seem to make sense in terms of advancing genes to the next generation, he can always assert that it's probably some secondary effect that arose in conjuction with a more successful set of genes.
Surely he wouldn't do this so blatantly! Yes, he does. This is his explanation for the existence of homosexuality. Obviously, homosexuality does little to propagate genes in a direct sense. And yet, a fairly uniform percentage of humans in all societies are homosexual, or at least far enough from purely heterosexual to notice it. This is a universal human trait-- just the kind that evolutionary psychology purports to study!-- and yet, the explanation is no better than, "Well, it's probably just linked to something else that's necessary in the genetic code." Wright is going to have to do better than that in my book.
Another general criticism I have is that the book is quite androcentric. Wright focuses mostly on male behavior, with the hackneyed excuse that it's more interesting. After all, females are the ones that hold the sexual power-- they are a resource that males must compete for. Hence, male competition is fiercer, male hierarchies are more serious, and in general, male behavior exemplifies the struggle for reproductive success.
Sigh. Yet again, females are portrayed as paler, less interesting versions of males. Give me a break, Wright! You of all people should know that there is an evolutionary explanation for androcentrism. Males are inordinately focused on each other exactly because they are in sexual and status-related competition with each other. Men pay attention to other men. Men glorify and vilify each other with gusto. They write biographies of each other, erect monuments to each other, kill each other, and admire each other to a far greater degree than they do any of those things with women. Hence, it is not surprising that Wright and other males find female behavior to be less interesting than their own. How could it possibly be as interesting as the activities of their chief rivals?
Now that I understand a bit about evolutionary psychology, I can turn the arguments into an explanation of androcentrism, but that is not an excuse for the male focus of "The Moral Animal." (After all, the final chapters remind us that we have big enough brains to think beyond the basics of reproduction. We have evolved to be the most flexible creatures, with the widest range of possible behaviors with which to deal with our environment). Wright should have recognized that his personal evolutionary psychology is not designed to appreciate the female mind, and gotten himself a female co-author. As it stands, the book gives more insight into Charles Darwin than his devoted wife, whose sexual strategies must have been just as successful.
But anyway, read "The Moral Animal" for its new way of seeing the world. There is value in evolutionary psychology. Don't just read the criticisms that call it "social Darwinism" or some kind of right-wing determinist dogma. It's not scary. It even makes some sense. As Wright notes many times, biology is not politics. There's no gene for republicanism-- or liberalism either. You can accept the tenets of this theory and maintain a very wide range of political stances. And you may find that some things make a lot more sense when you think of them through the lens of evolutionary psychology.
I look forward to seeing this theory develop-- or evolve, perhaps-- as new evidence is uncovered through experiments. There are still some bugs to work out, but the basis is interesting and probably fruitful for our self-understanding.
Copyright © Kim Allen 2001
